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INTRODUCTION
One morning a district court judge sentenced three defendants
in separate cases. In the first case, the defendant’s offense had no
victims. In the second case, the defendant’s offense resulted in a hand-
ful of victims, whose harm constituted small financial loss. In the
third case, the defendant’s crime directly facilitated a multi-billion
dollar worldwide criminal enterprise with thousands of victims, all
of whom are children.
In only one of these cases did the judge sentence the defendant
below the Sentencing Guidelines range: the case resulting in the
greatest harm.
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The defendant’s crime in that case facilitated criminal activity
that caused children, including babies, to be violently sexually abused.
This crime was possession of child pornography.
The hypothetical does not present a unique scenario. Even though
district courts now have the discretion to sentence defendants below
the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, their sentences still
fall within the recommended range in the vast majority of cases; in
fact, in 2009, district court judges sentenced defendants below the
recommended Guidelines range in only 16.9% of all cases.1 If a defen-
dant was charged with possessing child pornography, however, nearly
half of all federal judges in 2009 gave below-Guidelines sentences.2
Some of these defendants even received probation, a sentence well
below the Guidelines imprisonment range.3
In one example, the defendant, an elementary school teacher for
more than thirty years, possessed hundreds of images of child por-
nography, including images of “ ‘an adult male performing oral sex
on a prepubescent female’ ” and children being raped.4 The defendant
argued that he should not be sentenced within the recommended
Guidelines range of thirty-seven to forty-six months because he was
simply a “ ‘curious, casual user’ ” and his viewing of the images con-
stituted a “ ‘solitary, private activity.’ ” 5 The defense attorney capi-
talized on this argument, asserting that the defendant’s crime was
something that the defendant did alone and never involved “another
human being.” 6 The prosecutor responded that possession of child
pornography is a serious crime, but the judge interrupted her, stating
that it was really only “a psychological crime.” 7 The judge sentenced
the defendant to four months’ imprisonment.8
Another case involved a defendant who downloaded hundreds
of child pornographic images, “some depicting children as young as
2 or 3 being vaginally penetrated by adult males.” 9 He masturbated
while he watched them.10 Although the Guidelines range for this




4. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 251, 258 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting the pre-
sentence report); Audrey Rogers, Child Pornography’s Forgotten Victims, 28 PACE L.
REV. 847, 848 (2008).
5. Goff, 501 F.3d at 252, 258 (quoting the defendant’s brief).
6. Id. at 253, 258 (citation omitted).
7. Id. at 258 (citation omitted).
8. Id. at 251.
9. United States v. Goldberg, 491 F.3d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted);
see also Rogers, supra note 4, at 849 (discussing the defendant’s actions and sentence
received in United States v. Goldberg).
10. Goldberg, 491 F.3d at 669.
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defendant was sixty-three to seventy-eight months of prison, the
district court sentenced him to one day in jail.11 In justifying this
sentence, the district court found “that the defendant was not a real
deviant because he had committed the crime out of ‘boredom and
stupidity,’ ” and that sending him to jail “would ruin his life.”12 The
judge further relied on her conclusion that no “ ‘actual children are
at risk’ ” from the defendant.13
Federal judges’ views that possession of child pornography is
not that serious were brought to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission recently, with some federal judges asking the Sentencing
Commission to lower the Guidelines offense level and enhancements
for this offense because they are too harsh.14
Unfortunately, these judges’ views are all too common. In the
last six months of 2009, publications ranging from those that address
the law, to those that address politics and the economy, to those that
address women’s fashion have all published articles critical of the
criminal justice system’s treatment of those charged with and con-
victed of child sex offenses.
For example, the June 2009 edition of the A.B.A. Journal fea-
tured an article entitled A Reluctant Rebellion in which the author
described critics’ views that possession of child pornography laws
carry penalties that “far exceed the seriousness of the crime.”15
Two months later, the August 8, 2009, cover story of the Econo-
mist was entitled America’s Unjust Sex Laws, with the author of
that article questioning our country’s sex offender registration re-
quirements.16
A few months after that, in the December 2009 edition of Vanity
Fair, an article entitled A Crime of Shadows scrutinized law enforce-
ment techniques employed in investigating and apprehending in-
dividuals who use the computer to prey on children, and seemed to
question the general culpability of these defendants as well.17
Unlike many sentencing judges and some of society at large, our
federal legislature and executive branch have committed themselves
to fighting possession of child pornography.18 Still, there remains
11. Id.
12. Id. at 671.
13. Id.
14. Lynne Marek, Sentences for Possession of Child Porn May Be Too High, Judges
Say, NAT’L L.J. (Sept. 10, 2009), http://www.law.com/newswire/cache/1202433693658
.html.
15. Mark Hansen, A Reluctant Rebellion, A.B.A. J., June 2009, at 54, 56.
16. Illiberal Politics: America’s Unjust Sex Laws, ECONOMIST, Aug. 8, 2009, at 9.
17. See Mark Bowden, A Crime of Shadows, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2009, at 244 (analyz-
ing both sides of an actual case and the techniques used to catch child predators).
18. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE PROJECT SAFE
CHILDHOOD INITIATIVE (2006), [hereinafter FACT SHEET] available at http://www.justice
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one statute that does not treat this offense as seriously as it treats
the other federal sex crimes against children: the Bail Reform Act
of 1984.19
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 was promulgated by Congress to help
protect society against crimes committed by defendants on pretrial
release.20 In doing so, Congress declared that defendants charged with
certain sex crimes against minors be subjected to mandatory pretrial
release conditions, and, if the government moved to detain them pre-
trial, that they would be subject to a rebuttable presumption of deten-
tion.21 Unlike other federal sex crimes against children, possession of
child pornography is not included in the mandatory-release-condition
category of cases or in the rebuttable presumption category.22
Amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to treat possession of
child pornography offenses the same way it treats other sex crimes
against children is important because we simply cannot continue to
ignore the true nature of this offense. A belief that the defendants
who commit this offense are not dangerous rests on a misunderstand-
ing of the offense itself.23 This offense results in grave harm to real
children—more harm than most other offenses.24 These harms in-
clude the physical and emotional abuse endured by the real child vic-
tims who are portrayed in the pornographic images; the continued
abuse these victims suffer each time that the image is viewed; the
continued market that is fueled by demand for more and more porno-
graphic images; the injurious effects on the defendants themselves
when they view and share the images; and the use of child pornog-
raphy to abuse additional children.25 By not recognizing the true
nature of the crime, we are complicit in allowing the horrific abuse
being endured by children worldwide to continue unabated.
Analyzing the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is timely for two reasons.
First, this statute is based on an incapacitation theory of justice, a
theory on which more and more statutes are being based.26 Under an
incapacitation theory, statutes are promulgated to benefit society
.gov/opa/pr/2006/February/06_opa_081.html (discussing actions taken in the fight against
the sexual exploitation of children on the internet).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
20. Kenneth Fredrich Berg, The Bail Reform Act of 1984, 34 EMORY L.J. 685, 686
(1985).
21. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), (e).
22. Id.
23. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 860-62 (discussing the perceived harmlessness of child
pornography possession).
24. Id. at 853.
25. See infra Parts III.B.1-4 (discussing harm caused by viewing child pornography).
26. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 1217, 1232-33 (2002) (discussing how the incapacitation theory has become dominant
in criminal law and how the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is based on that theory).
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at large by protecting it from dangerous defendants.27 One of the
Bail Reform Act’s main purposes is to protect society from crimes
committed by defendants on pretrial release.28 It is important that
an incapacitation-based statute be properly crafted so as to fully
achieve its purpose. As incapacitation-based statutes are becoming
increasingly popular, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides a useful
example of how best to analyze these statutes.
This article argues that the proper way for a legislature to craft
an incapacitation-based statute is to: (1) identify the statute’s benefits
and its costs and burdens; (2) look at the harm caused by a particular
offense and the defendant’s culpability in committing the offense so
as to determine whether a defendant poses a danger to society and
thus determine whether society needs to be protected from the offense;
and (3) if the defendant does pose a danger to society, determine how
to best protect society by balancing and weighing the harm caused
by the offense against the statute’s costs and burdens. In addition,
the legislature should ensure that, if all offenses result in the same
harm, and if the statute’s costs and burdens are the same for each
of these offenses, the statute should treat these offenses similarly.
When the grave harm resulting from possession of child por-
nography is weighed against the costs and burdens of detaining a
defendant pretrial or releasing him subject to mandatory release con-
ditions, and when it is recognized that the other, included sex crimes
against children result in the same harm as possession of child por-
nography, it becomes clear that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 must be
amended for it to fully achieve its underlying purpose. At present, the
statute does not treat possession of child pornography in proportion
to the danger posed by a defendant who commits this offense. The
statute also does not properly weigh the harm that results from this
offense against pretrial treatment’s costs and burdens, nor does it
treat possession of child pornography offenses consistently with other
offenses resulting in the same harm. Simply put, by amending the
statute to treat possession of child pornography with the seriousness
that it deserves, Congress would help it to achieve its underlying
incapacitation-based purpose.
Analyzing the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is also timely because
federal judges are increasingly forced to make pretrial decisions in
possession of child pornography cases as the number of these prosecu-
tions has increased.29 This is true because the Department of Justice
27. Id. at 1232.
28. See id. at 1233 (noting the Bail Reform Act of 1984 permitted detention without
bail and that this was done to protect the community).
29. See Efrati, supra note 1 (noting that in 2009 the Justice Department handled its
highest number of child pornography cases since beginning to track the statistic).
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has targeted child pornography offenses as a national concern and
has designated prosecuting this offense a national priority.30
With the Department of Justice’s new priority, sex crime offenses
are now “ ‘among the fastest growing crimes handled by the federal
justice system,’ ” 31 with pornography offenses becoming the majority
of these cases.32 In 1994, 74% of all sexual exploitation cases referred
for federal prosecution involved sexual abuse.33 That percentage fell
to 16% by 2006, but child pornography cases referred for federal pros-
ecution increased from 22% to 69% during this same time period.34
In 2008, United States Attorney’s Offices around the country prose-
cuted 2211 computer-based child exploitation cases, the vast majority
of which were for possession of child pornography.35 This number is
more than double the number prosecuted five years earlier.36 Thus,
this issue is of pressing concern.
Part I of this article will address the history of bail in our country
and explain how that history led us to the current bail statute, the
Bail Reform Act of 1984. In doing so, the article will discuss the legis-
lative incapacitation-based intent behind the statute. Part II will
explain how incapacitation-based statutes should be crafted so as to
fully achieve their goals. Part III will apply this analysis to the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 and argue that it should be amended to treat pos-
session of child pornography offenses the same way that the Act treats
other federal sex crimes against children. Lastly, Part IV addresses
an anticipated argument against the proposed amendments.
I. BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ITS HISTORY AND
CURRENT PRACTICE
A. History of Bail in the United States
Bail has always been part of our criminal justice system, but
the Constitution provides only that, “[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punish-
ments inflicted.” 37
30. FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
31. James M. Byrne, Arthur J. Lurigio & Roger Pimentel, New Defendants, New
Responsibilities: Preventing Suicide among Alleged Sex Offenders in the Federal Pretrial
System, 73 FED. PROBATION, 40, 42 (Sept. 2009) (quoting M. MOTIVANS, FEDERAL
PROSECUTION OF CHILD EXPLOITATION OFFENDERS 1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2007)
(2006)).
32. Id. at 41.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Amir Efrati, Making Punishments Fit the Most Offensive Crimes, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 23, 2008, at A14.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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The mechanics of bail are instead governed by our Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and by our bail statute.38 They require that,
after a defendant is arrested, he or she be taken to a judge “without
unnecessary delay.” 39 At the first court appearance, the judge must
inform the defendant of the complaint against him, his right to be
represented by counsel, his right to a preliminary hearing, and his
right to remain silent.40 Also, the judge must determine whether the
defendant should be detained pretrial or released, and, if released,
what, if any, amount of bond applies and what, if any, conditions of
release should be imposed.41
Historically, courts have detained defendants only if they posed
a risk of flight or were charged with a capital crime.42 The rationale
for detaining those charged with capital crimes was that they were
more likely to flee.43 Whether a defendant posed a danger to society
was irrelevant to bail determinations.44
Although the traditional purpose of bail was simply to ensure the
appearance of a defendant at trial, pretrial release was often unavail-
able to defendants who could not afford it.45 This apparent inequity
“led to a national bail reform movement in the early 1960s.” 46
During that time, Congress began investigating bail practices
around the country and discovered a wide disparity in bail procedures:
“[s]ome district courts routinely released . . . defendants on their
own recognizance while other[s] . . . never granted such releases,”
and others seemed to detain a high percentage of indigent defendants
who could not afford bail.47 These inconsistencies prompted passage
of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.48
The underlying goal of the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was to enact
a system in which all defendants, no matter their net worth, would
be released pretrial on their own recognizance.49 Under this Act, a
court was required to release any defendant not charged with an
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. 46; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3156 (2006).
39. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a)(1)(A).
40. Id. at 5(d)(1).
41. Id. at 5(d)(1)(C), (d)(3).
42. JoAnn M. Arkfeld, Comment, The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1984: Effect of the
Dangerousness Determination on Pretrial Detention, 19 PAC. L.J. 1435, 1436 (1988)
(citation omitted).
43. Id. (citation omitted).
44. Id. at 1437 (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214
(1966) (repealed 1984)).
45. Id. at 1438 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 4-5 (1976)).
46. Id. (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 4-5 (1976)).
47. Id. at 1439-40 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 161-62 (1976)).
48. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1440 (citing W. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA
162-63 (1976)).
49. Id.
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offense punishable by death on the defendant’s own recognizance or on
an unsecured bond, unless the judge believed that the defendant posed
a flight risk.50 Only if the judge believed that a defendant posed a risk
of flight, could the judge detain a defendant or impose restrictions on
his pretrial release.51 Notably, the Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not
allow judges to detain a defendant pretrial if the judge believed that
the defendant posed a danger to the community or another person.52
B. The Bail Reform Act of 1984
1. Legislative History
Congress and the public became increasingly concerned with the
courts’ inability to consider a defendant’s dangerousness when mak-
ing pretrial decisions.53 In 1984, Congress addressed this concern and
passed the Bail Reform Act of 1984.54
This Act changed bail in our country in a radical way: with this
statute, judges were given the authority to detain a defendant, not
only because he posed a risk of flight, but also because he posed a risk
of danger to the community or to another person if released pretrial.55
Congress recognized the radical nature of their actions, stating,
“[t]he adoption of these changes marks a significant departure from
the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole pur-
pose of bail laws must be to assure the appearance of the defendant
at judicial proceedings.” 56 Congress engaged in this “significant depar-
ture” because of its concern, shared by the public, of the “alarming
problem of crimes committed by persons on release.” 57
In addition to trying to protect the public, in passing the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 Congress also gave district courts the ability to
conduct bail hearings fairly, thereby benefitting defendants.58
50. Id. (citation omitted).
51. Id. (citing Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966)
(repealed 1984)).
52. See id. at 1441 (citing R.A. Powers, Detention Under the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1984, 21 CRIM. L. BULL. 413, 414 (1985)) (noting that the only reason judges could detain
defendants is if they posed a flight risk).
53. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188-89.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2006).
55. Id. § 3142(e).
56. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 3.
57. Id. In passing the statute, the Senate referenced a study of release practices in
eight jurisdictions, finding that approximately one out of every six defendants was re-
arrested while on pretrial release. Id. at 6. Of these, one-third were arrested more than
once, “and some were rearrested as many as four times.” Id. (citing LAZAR INSTITUTE,
PRETRIAL RELEASE: AN EVALUATION OF DEFENDANT OUTCOMES AND PROGRAM IMPACT 48
(1981)).
58. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1446 (citation omitted).
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Before the Act, a court concerned that a defendant was dangerous,
could either “release the defendant prior to trial despite these fears,”
or it could detain the defendant by imposing a high money bond.59
Congress wrote, “it is intolerable that the law denies judges the tools
to make honest and appropriate decisions regarding the release of
such defendants.”60 Congress hoped the Act “would allow the courts to
address the issue of pretrial criminality honestly and effectively.” 61
It also hoped that the defendant would benefit from a more open
system because he would be fully informed of the issue before the
court, and because the government would be required to come forward
with information to support a finding of dangerousness, to which the
defendant could directly respond.62 Congress believed that the new
bail procedures would “promote candor, fairness, and effectiveness
for society,” crime victims, and defendants.63
Congress recognized that the Act constituted a departure from our
country’s prior bail proceedings, but reiterated the principle, “[n]othing
in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the pre-
sumption of innocence.” 64 In the end, Congress attempted to balance
a defendant’s presumption of innocence with the government’s duty
and mandate to protect the public while a defendant awaits trial.65
2. The Mechanics For Determining Pretrial Bail and
Detention
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 provides that, after a defendant is
arrested and brought to his first court appearance,66 the judge has
four options. She can: (1) release the defendant on his own recogni-
zance or upon the defendant signing an unsecured bond; (2) release
the defendant on conditions; (3) temporarily detain the defendant
pending “revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclu-
sion”; or (4) detain the defendant.67
59. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 5.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (2006).
65. See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 8-9 (discussing a defendant’s constitutional rights and
the possibility of pretrial detention).
66. The defendants charged with committing possession of child pornography offenses
are: 99% middle-aged male, 89% white, 96.3% United States citizens, 42% with some
level of college education, and 79.9% have no prior felony convictions. Byrne, Lurigio &
Pimentel, supra note 31, at 41-42. Because these defendants are 99% male, this article
refers to them by using the masculine pronoun “he,” but it should be noted that women do
account for a small percentage of defendants charged with possessing child pornography.
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a).
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Just as with the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the Act of 1984 makes
pretrial release the preferred option.68 To that end, the Bail Reform
Act of 1984 still requires a judge to release a defendant pretrial on
his own personal recognizance or on an unsecured bond unless the
judge determines that such release would not reasonably ensure the
defendant’s presence at trial or unless the judge determines that
doing so would “endanger the safety of any other person or the com-
munity.” 69 The Act also specifically prohibits a judge from imposing
bail that would, in effect, result in the pretrial detention of a defen-
dant who could not afford it.70
a. Pretrial Release with Conditions
Only if the judge determines that pretrial release on the defen-
dant’s own recognizance or on an unsecured bond would not reasonably
assure the defendant’s appearance or the safety of another person
or community may the judge order that a defendant’s pretrial release
be subject to certain conditions.71
If the judge determines that pretrial release conditions should
be ordered, the court must choose the “least restrictive further con-
dition, or combination of conditions . . . [to] reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other
person and the community . . . .” 72 The judge may impose, but is not
limited to, the following conditions requiring that the defendant:
(1) remain in the custody of a particular person; (2) “maintain employ-
ment”; (3) “commence an educational program”; (4) “abide by speci-
fied restrictions on personal associations, place of abode, or travel”;
(5) “avoid all contact with an alleged victim . . . and with a potential
witness”; (6) “report . . . to a designated law enforcement agency”;
(7) “comply with a specified curfew”; (8) “refrain from possessing a
firearm”; (9) “refrain from excessive use of alcohol” or illegal drugs;
(10) undergo medical, psychiatric, and/or substance abuse treatment;
(11) provide security for the bond; and/or (12) “execute a bail bond
with solvent sureties.” 73
68. Bail Reform Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-465, § 3146(a), 80 Stat. 214, 214 (1966)
(repealed 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b); see also Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1441-42 (discussing what
a judge must find in order to deny pretrial release).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c); see also Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1442 (noting that a judge
cannot impose a financial condition that, as a result of the financial situation of the de-
fendant, results in pretrial detention).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
72. Id. § 3142(c)(B).
73. Id.
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Other release conditions not specifically listed in the statute,
but which are nonetheless available to a judge, include remote com-
puter monitoring, field inspections, and full forensic searches of a
defendant’s computer.74
If a defendant is charged with committing certain sex crimes
against minors, and if the judge determines that the defendant may
be released pretrial, the judge must impose the following conditions:
(1) electronic monitoring; (2) specific restrictions on the defendant’s
associations, residence, and travel; (3) no contact with the alleged
victim and any potential witness at trial; (4) mandatory reporting
“on a regular basis to a designated law enforcement agency, pretrial
services agency, or other agency”; (5) a curfew; and (6) a prohibition
against “possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous
weapon.” 75 Possession of child pornography is one of the only federal
sex crimes against minors that is not included in the list of offenses
requiring mandatory release conditions.76
b. Pretrial Detention
With respect to detention, a judge is not authorized to detain
all defendants pretrial; instead, the judge is restrained by several
statutory requirements and prohibitions.
First, only if a defendant has been charged with certain offenses
that are specifically enumerated in the statute, or if the defendant
poses a flight risk, may the court impose pretrial detention.77 Second,
the government must move for detention.78
If the defendant qualifies for detention and if the government has
moved to detain him, a detention hearing should be held at the de-
fendant’s first court appearance or within five days thereafter.79 At
the detention hearing, the defendant has a right to be represented by
counsel, “to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses,”
74. Jon Muller, Implementing Pretrial Services Risk Assessment with a Sex Offense
Defendant Population, 73 FED. PROBATION, 45, 46 (2009).
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B).
76. See id. (listing the offenses requiring a conditioned pretrial release). Besides pos-
session of child pornography, the sexual abuse of a minor or ward under 18 U.S.C. § 2243
is also not included in § 3142(c). This statute criminalizes the sexual act with a minor
who is in prison, who is between twelve and sixteen years old, and who is at least four
years younger than the defendant. Id. § 2243. The exclusion of this offense is beyond the
scope of this article.
77. Id. § 3142(f).
78. Id. The government or the court may also move for detention in a case that involves
a serious risk that the defendant will flee or a serious risk that the defendant “will
obstruct or attempt to obstruct justice.” Id. § 3142(f)(2).
79. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).
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and to proffer information.80 Before ordering pretrial detention, the
judge must find that no pretrial release condition or combination
of conditions would reasonably assure the defendant’s presence or
another’s safety by clear and convincing evidence.81
At this hearing, the judge must consider the following factors:
(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense”;82 (2) “the weight
of the evidence against the [defendant]”;83 (3) “the history and char-
acteristics of the [defendant]”;84 and (4) “the nature and seriousness”
of the danger to the community or any person should the defendant
be released.85
As stated above, unless the defendant is a flight risk, detention
is not available in every case, but instead is limited to those cases in
which a defendant has been charged with an offense that Congress
specifically delineated as allowing the possibility of pretrial detention;
if a defendant is charged with an offense not listed, a judge may not
order that defendant detained.86 This decision to limit the availability
of detention was made after Congress determined that, “there is a
small but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as
to whom neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the
prospect of revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the
community or other persons.” 87 Congress only granted judges the
power to deny pretrial release to this very limited group of offenders.88
If the defendant is not a flight risk, the government may seek
detention only if the case involves: (1) “a crime of violence”;89 (2) the
sexual trafficking of children under 18 U.S.C. § 1591;90 (3) acts of
terrorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B) for which the maximum
80. Id.
81. Id. § 3142(e)-(f).
82. Id. § 3142(g)(1). This factor includes “whether the offense is a crime of violence, a
Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm,
explosive, or destructive device.” Id.
83. Id. § 3142(g)(2).
84. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3). This factor includes:
(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employ-
ment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community
ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history,
and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and (B) whether,
at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on
parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion
of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law . . . .
Id.
85. Id. § 3142(g)(4).
86. Id. § 3142(f).
87. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
88. Id. at 7.
89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(A).
90. Id.
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term of imprisonment is ten years or more;91 (4) “an offense for which
the maximum sentence is life imprisonment or death”;92 (5) a con-
trolled substance offense for which the maximum term of imprison-
ment is ten years or more;93 (6) any felony if the defendant has been
previously convicted of two or more of the following offenses: a crime
of violence, an act involving terrorism which has a maximum term of
imprisonment of ten years or more, an offense for which the maxi-
mum sentence is life imprisonment or death, or a controlled sub-
stance offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten
years or more;94 or (7) “any felony that is not otherwise a crime of vio-
lence that involves a minor victim,” use or possession of a dangerous
weapon, or failure to register as a sex offender.95
Under provision (7) above, the government may seek detention
in all cases involving felony sex crimes against a minor, including
cases charging a defendant with possession of child pornography.96
c. The Rebuttable Presumption of Detention
Just as a defendant walks into court at trial bearing a presump-
tion of innocence, the defendant typically walks into court at the bond
hearing with the related presumption that he should be released
pending trial.97 In the Bail Reform Act of 1984, however, Congress
included what is known as the “rebuttable presumption” for certain
serious offenses.98
Under this doctrine, if a defendant has been charged with a spe-
cific type of offense and if the government has moved for detention,
a defendant will walk into court at the bond hearing facing a pre-
sumption that he should be detained pending trial.99 In this case, the
defendant bears the burden of production; that is, the defendant must
establish a basis for concluding that there are conditions of release
sufficient to assure that he will not engage in dangerous criminal
activity pending trial.100
91. Id.
92. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(B).
93. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(C).
94. Id. § 3142(f)(1)(D).
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1)(E).
96. Id. Under the sentencing classifications in the United States Code, a felony is any
offense punishable by more than one year. Id. § 3559(a)(1)-(5). The sentencing range for
possession of child pornography exceeds one year, and therefore, the offense is classified
as a felony. Id. §§ 2252(b)(1), 2252A(b)(1).
97. Id. § 3142(b).
98. Id. § 3142(e).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e).
100. Id.
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It is presumed that no condition or combination of conditions will
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the
safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is prob-
able cause to believe that the person: (1) committed a controlled sub-
stance offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten
years or more; (2) used, carried, or possessed a firearm in, during,
and in relation to or in furtherance of a crime of violence or a drug
trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);101 (3) conspired
to kill, kidnap, maim or injure persons or damage property in a for-
eign country under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a);102 (4) engaged in acts of ter-
rorism under 18 U.S.C. § 2332b;103 or (5) engaged in certain offenses
involving a minor.104
Possession of child pornography is one of the only federal sex
crimes against minors that is not listed as one of the offenses that
triggers the rebuttable presumption.105
3. The Bail Reform Act of 1984’s Different Treatment of
Possession of Child Pornography Offenses
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 treats possession of child pornog-
raphy differently from other sex crimes against children in two ways:
(1) it is not included in the list of sex crimes against children that man-
dates imposition of release conditions if the defendant is released
pretrial;106 and (2) it is not included in the list of sex crimes against
children that triggers a rebuttable presumption of detention.107
With the rebuttable presumption, the Bail Reform Act of 1984
states that the following offenses involving a minor trigger the rebut-
table presumption: kidnapping; sex trafficking; aggravated sexual
abuse; sexual abuse; abusive sexual contact; offenses against minors
resulting in death; sexual exploitation; selling or buying children;
transporting child pornography; receiving child pornography; selling
101. Id. § 924(c).
102. Id. § 956(a).
103. Id. § 2332b.
104. These sex offenses are: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1591, 2241, 2242, 2244(a)(1), 2245,
2251, 2251A, 2252(a)(1), 2252(a)(2), 2252(a)(3), 2252A(a)(1), 2252A(a)(2), 2252A(a)(3),
2252A(a)(4), 2260, 2421, 2422, 2423, and 2425. Id. § 3142(e).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Just as with the mandatory release conditions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(c), another federal sex crime against a minor that is not included in § 3142(e) is
the sexual abuse of a minor or ward under § 2243. Id. Again, the exclusion of this offense
is beyond the scope of this article.
106. The mandatory conditioned release provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c), does not mention
§ 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5). Id. § 3142(c).
107. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) does not mention § 2252(a)(4) or § 2252A(a)(5) as creating a
rebuttable presumption of detention. Id. § 3142(e).
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child pornography; reproducing child pornography or advertising/
soliciting child pornography; producing child pornography; transport-
ing someone for sexual activity; coercing or enticing a minor to engage
in illegal sexual activity; transporting minors; or using interstate facil-
ities to transit information about a minor.108 A glaring omission, pos-
session of child pornography is not included.109
Similarly, defendants subject to mandatory release conditions are
defendants charged with these exact same crimes involving a minor,
in addition to defendants charged with failing to register as a sex of-
fender.110 Here again, possession of child pornography is omitted.111
4. The Bail Reform Act of 1984 Constitutes an Incapacitation-
Based Statute
As explained above, in passing the Bail Reform Act of 1984,
Congress acted on the “deep public concern” about crimes committed
by people on pretrial release and promulgated a statute concerned
with protecting the public.112
To that end, Congress crafted a statute that, although trying to
balance the rights of the accused with its obligation to protect the
citizenry, treated certain offenses differently than others.113 That is,
Congress hand-picked certain offenses that it believed defendants
charged with, and ultimately proven to have committed, posed a risk
of danger to the community.114 Congress did this in three ways: (1) by
limiting the availability of detention to only certain crimes;115 (2) by
further providing a rebuttable presumption of detention to an even
narrower category of offenses;116 and (3) by mandating certain release
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. These offenses include violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (kidnapping); § 1591 (sex
trafficking); § 2241 (aggravated sexual abuse); § 2242 (sexual abuse); § 2244(a)(1) (abusive
sexual contact); § 2245 (offenses resulting in death); § 2251 (sexual exploitation of
children); § 2251A (selling or buying of children); § 2252(a)(1) (transporting child por-
nography); § 2252(a)(2) (receiving child pornography); § 2252(a)(3) (selling child pornog-
raphy); § 2252A(a)(1) (transporting child pornography); § 2252A(a)(2) (receiving child
pornography); § 2252A(a)(3) (reproducing child pornography or advertising/soliciting child
pornography); § 2252A(a)(4) (selling child pornography); § 2260 (production of child
pornography); § 2421 (transporting someone for sexual activity); § 2422 (coercion and
enticement); § 2423 (transportation of minors); § 2425 (use of interstate facilities to
transmit information about a minor); § 2250 (failure to register under the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act). 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c).
111. Id.
112. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3188.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Id. at 6-7.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(1).
116. Id. § 3142(e).
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conditions if a defendant is released pretrial but has been charged
with committing certain crimes.117
By attempting to protect the public against crimes committed
by defendants on pretrial release, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 adopts
an incapacitation theory, one of the four penological theories existing
today.118 These four theories are: retribution, rehabilitation, incapaci-
tation, and deterrence.119
A criminal justice system seeking retribution tailors the pun-
ishment of a crime to the moral blameworthiness of the criminal act
itself.120 A retributive system considers only the defendant’s past
actions when fashioning a sentence.121 In determining the degree of
blameworthiness for a particular offense, society looks to “the nature
and seriousness of the harm caused or threatened by the crime,” and
to “the offender’s degree of culpability,” such as his intent, motive,
and role.122
The remaining three purposes—rehabilitation, incapacitation,
and deterrence—constitute utilitarian models of justice.123 Under these
utilitarian theories, the goal of the criminal justice system looks for-
ward, not backwards, and its purpose is to treat criminal offenders
in ways that benefit society in the future; thus, societal benefit is of
primary concern when dealing with a defendant.124
Under a deterrence theory, the criminal justice system will treat
offenders in ways that will deter that offender and society in general
from committing similar criminal acts in the future.125 Under a re-
habilitation theory, the criminal justice system will attempt to reha-
bilitate the offender, thereby benefiting society at large.126 Finally,
incapacitation theory attempts to protect the public by imprisoning
dangerous individuals so that they cannot continue to inflict harm.127
The past several decades have seen an emergence of incapacita-
tion theory as society has begun to believe that a small number of
117. Id. § 3142(c).
118. See Note, supra note 26, at 1233 (discussing the incapacitation theory behind the
Bail Reform Act); Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution
as an Articulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1315
(2000) (noting the four theories of criminal punishment).
119. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1315.
120. Id.
121. Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth
Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 590 (2005).
122. Id.
123. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
124. Frase, supra note 121, at 592.
125. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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repeat offenders account for a disproportionate share of criminal
offenses committed.128
The penological theory underlying the Bail Reform Act of 1984
is clear: one of the statute’s main goals is to protect the public from
crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release.129 Thus, the
Bail Reform Act of 1984 has a utilitarian goal and constitutes an
incapacitation-based statute. To that end, the statute is consistent
with the dominating penological theory of the day.
II. PROPER ANALYSIS OF INCAPACITATION-BASED STATUTES
At first blush it would seem easy to craft and implement an
incapacitation-based statute, but upon closer review it becomes
apparent that legislatures do not always engage in proper analysis,
with the result being a statute that does not fully achieve its goal or
does more harm than good. Many believe that incapacitation-based
statutes need not concern themselves with tailoring the criminal
justice system’s treatment of a defendant to the charged offense, and
in so believing, ignore the offense’s resulting harm.
Even though “[t]he principle that a punishment should be pro-
portionate to the crime is deeply rooted” in our jurisprudence,130 some
retribution theorists assert that proportionality principles are not
relevant to incapacitation-based statutes.131 This initially seems to
make sense because, under retribution theory, the key question in
determining the proper treatment of a defendant is to assign a level
of moral blameworthiness to the offense and then tailor the treat-
ment to that assignment.132 In assessing the moral blameworthiness,
128. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 287, 309 (2001). One well-known example of a recent incapacitation-based
statute is the “three strikes” law. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003) (con-
sidering CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (West 1999)).
129. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
130. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
131. For example, Justice Scalia has opined that, “[p]roportionality—the notion that the
punishment should fit the crime—is inherently a concept tied to the penological goal of
retribution.” Ewing, 538 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring). He further wrote, “it be-
comes difficult even to speak intelligently of ‘proportionality,’ once deterrence and reha-
bilitation are given significant weight.” Id. (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
989 (1991)). Scalia continues, “not to mention giving weight to the purpose of California’s
three strikes law: incapacitation.” Id. See also Frase, supra note 121, at 589 n.98 (quoting
Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive
Penalties, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 192 (1995) (noting that “proportionality [of a forfei-
ture] can only be measured in relationship to the owner’s culpability.”); Allyn G. Heald,
Comment, United States v. Gonzalez: In Search of a Meaningful Proportionality Principle,
58 BROOK. L. REV. 455, 455 n.2 (1992) (describing how “the proportionality principle is
inherently a retributive concept”)).
132. Frase, supra note 121, at 590.
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society looks to the harm caused by the act and to the culpability of
the defendant in committing the act.133 In the end, the criminal jus-
tice system’s treatment of a defendant must be proportional to both.
In contrast, under a utilitarian theory, the criminal justice sys-
tem should benefit society as a whole, and under the incapacitation
theory, a subset of utilitarian theory, the criminal justice system’s
treatment of an offender should be tailored to protecting the public.134
According to some theorists, then, no proportionality between the
crime committed and the subsequent treatment of the defendant is
needed because the goal of that theory is not to connect the treatment
with the offense, but simply to protect the public from future harm.135
So if a dangerous defendant commits a minor offense, he should re-
ceive a severe prison sentence simply because he is dangerous, and
conversely if a benign defendant commits a serious offense, he should
not receive a severe prison sentence because he is not dangerous.136
At least one commentator, however, has argued that proportion-
ality principles do apply to incapacitation models of justice, and has
introduced two non-retributive proportionality concepts.137 Specifi-
cally, Richard Frase has proposed two types of proportionality that
should be achieved under an incapacitation-based system: (1) means
proportionality; and (2) ends proportionality.138
Under Frase’s means proportionality principle, the criminal jus-
tice system’s treatment of a defendant is disproportionate if less costly
or burdensome treatments will achieve the same societal benefit.139
Under the ends proportionality principle, the criminal justice
system’s treatment of a defendant may be disproportionate to the
societal benefit if the costs and burdens of the defendant’s treatment
outweigh these benefits.140
Here, one of the main goals or benefits of the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 is to protect society against crimes committed by defendants
on pretrial release.141 According to Frase’s theory, to avoid issuing
disproportionate punishment, society needs to employ the least costly
133. Id.
134. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1316.
135. See Frase, supra note 121, at 573 (noting Justice Scalia’s view that courts can
consider theories of justice, such as incapacitation, that have nothing to do with pro-
portionality).
136. See Cotton, supra note 118, at 1318 (discussing sentencing principles in a utili-
tarian theory under which dangerous crimes would receive longer sentences and “less
socially harmful crimes” would receive shorter sentences).
137. Frase, supra note 121, at 576.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 592-93.
140. Id.
141. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6-7 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3189.
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or burdensome pretrial treatment that will protect society and the
costs and burdens of the treatment should not be greater than the
protection offered.142
It seems to reason that the harm resulting from a charged
offense is relevant to the analysis because it speaks directly to the
question of how dangerous a defendant may be and how much pro-
tection against him is needed, which in turn speaks directly to the
question of how to compare the protection needed against the costs
and burdens.
The Supreme Court has recognized the relevance of harm, even
if the proportionality analysis is based on an incapacitation-based
“three strikes” statute.143 Specifically, the Supreme Court has con-
sistently considered the proportionality of the penalty in deciding
whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and un-
usual punishment is violated.144 In determining whether the treat-
ment is grossly disproportionate to the offense, the Court has looked
to “the gravity of the offense” and “the harshness of the penalty.”145
In determining the gravity of the offense, courts may further look to
“harm caused or threatened to the victim or society, and the culpa-
bility of the offender.”146 Because the Court has “recognized that the
Eighth Amendment imposes ‘parallel limitations’ on bail,” this line
of cases seem to support the proposition that bail decisions should
be in proportion to the harm a defendant threatens if released.147
Thus, applying the Supreme Court’s analysis for excessive punish-
ment, determining whether the treatment of a defendant pending
trial is proportionate to the offense for which he is charged requires
the lawmaker to look to the “gravity of the offense,” which, in turn,
requires the legislature to look to the “harm caused.”148
142. Frase, supra note 121, at 592-93.
143. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (discussing the seriousness of the
defendant’s offenses); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-92 (1983) (stating that courts
should look at the nature of the offense to determine proportionality).
144. See Frase, supra note 121, at 576-88 (discussing major cases that have considered
the proportionality of punishment requirements under the Eighth Amendment) (citing
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982); Solem, 463
U.S. 277; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991); Ewing, 538 U.S. 11; Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)).
145. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
146. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
147. Id. at 289 (quoting Ingraham v. White, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977)).
148. Frase also notes that “utilitarian theory might consider not only the harm asso-
ciated with a particular act similar to the defendant’s, but also the aggregate harm caused
by all such actions and the difficulty of detecting and deterring such actions.” Frase, supra
note 121, at 594-95 (citing Malcolm E. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment:
An Examination of the Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 851-52 (1972)).
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Using both Frase’s proportionality concept with the Supreme
Court’s recognition of harm, crafting and implementing an incapac-
itation-based statute like the Bail Reform Act of 1984 requires the
legislature to do several things.
First, Congress should identity the goal of the statute and the
statute’s costs and burdens.
After these two elements have been identified, Congress should
then examine the statute’s goal, and if that goal is to protect society,
it should look at the harm caused by a particular offense and the de-
fendant’s culpability in determining whether a defendant poses a dan-
ger to society. If the defendant does pose a danger to society, Congress
should next determine how to best protect society against this danger
by balancing and weighing the offense’s resulting harm against the
costs and burdens of protection. Whenever Congress weighs the harm
against the costs and burdens, it is required to make public policy de-
cisions.149 In addition, Congress should ensure that when all offenses
result in the same harm, and when the statute’s costs and burdens
are the same for each of these offenses, the statute should treat these
offenses similarly so as to fully achieve the law’s purpose.
In applying this analysis to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, it be-
comes clear that the statute is deficient and should be amended in
at least two ways: (1) the statute’s rebuttable presumption category,
found at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3), should be amended to add possession
149. Some will argue that this test is not useful because a less serious offense still jus-
tifies a severe sentence if the defendant who commits the offense is dangerous. Although
this argument makes sense in the abstract, in reality we simply cannot know if a de-
fendant who commits a minor offense does indeed present a danger. In fact, the best
single predictor of future criminal activity—i.e., the best predictor that a defendant is
dangerous—is prior criminality. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment:
Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 423
(2006). “Indeed, no risk factor has been more thoroughly studied and none have gener-
ated more reliable results.” Id. (citing Alfred Blumstein, Preface to 2 CRIMINAL CAREERS
AND “CAREER CRIMINALS,” at vii (Alfred Blumstein et al., eds.) (1986)). “ ‘[A] history of
violence has been consistently shown to be the best single predictor of future violent
behavior.’ ” Id. (quoting Dale E. McNiel, Empirically Based Clinical Evaluation and
Management of the Potentially Violent Patient, in EMERGENCIES IN MENTAL HEALTH
PRACTICE: EVALUATION AND MANAGEMENT 95, 96 (Phillip M. Kleespies ed., 1998)). Under
this test, many “three strikes and you’re out” statutes would likely fail if they do not take
into account the harm that results from a defendant’s current and/or prior offenses. It is
doubtful that “three strikes and you’re out” statutes that do not account for the harm
resulting from a defendant’s offenses would pass the proposed test here, because the
statutes’ costs and burdens would arguably outweigh its benefits. In addition, a related
question to ask is how the Bail Reform Act should treat a defendant who has prior con-
victions involving sex crimes against minors, but whose present charge does not qualify
for a rebuttable presumption or mandatory release conditions. Specifically, should the
defendant’s prior criminal activity, which shows that he is dangerous, speak to whether
the defendant should be subject to pretrial detention, or, if released, subject to mandatory
release conditions? The answer is likely “yes,” but this analysis requires more time than
can be devoted to it here.
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of child pornography offenses; and (2) the statute’s mandatory release
conditions, found at 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B), should be amended to
include possession of child pornography offenses.
The Bail Reform Act of 1984’s current exclusion of possession of
child pornography in those sections addressing sexual offenses against
minors fails to achieve the goals of an incapacitation system: (1) by
not treating possession of child pornography commensurate with, and
proportionate to, the danger that a defendant charged with this offense
may pose and with the harm that results from the offense; and (2) by
not treating possession of child pornography consistently with other
crimes resulting in the same harm. Until the Bail Reform Act of 1984
is amended, it will not fully achieve its purpose of protecting society
against child sexual exploitation offenses committed by defendants
on pretrial release.
III. APPLYING PROPER ANALYSIS TO THE BAIL REFORM ACT OF 1984
A. Defining the Statute’s Benefits and Its Costs and Burdens
One of the Bail Reform Act’s main goals and benefits is the pro-
tection of society from crimes committed by defendants while on pre-
trial release.150
The statute’s costs and burdens consist of: (1) the burdens to
both the wrongly-charged and the correctly-charged defendant when
he is detained pretrial or subject to pretrial release conditions; and
(2) the potential negative effect that the criminal justice system’s
pretrial treatment of a defendant has on society’s perception of the
criminal justice system.
B. Determining Whether a Defendant Who Is Charged with
Possessing Child Pornography Poses a Danger to Society
After determining that one of the main goals of the Bail Reform
Act is to protect society, Congress should next analyze whether posses-
sion of child pornography results in harm from which society needs
protection and whether defendants charged with committing this
offense may be dangerous.
Only after we truly recognize the harm caused by possession of
child pornography, does it become clear that defendants who are
ultimately proven to have engaged in this offense are dangerous
and that society needs to be protected from them.151
150. Arkfeld, supra note 42, at 1437.
151. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 863 (“If we focus on the harm inflicted to a child when
an image of him being sexually abused is possessed and viewed, we can help dispel mis-
perceptions that possession is a victimless crime.”).
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Generally speaking, under an incapacitation-based system, a
defendant who commits a crime resulting in more serious harm will
be treated more severely than a defendant who commits a crime re-
sulting in less serious harm.152 This is so because society needs more
protection from serious harms than from less serious ones.
However, if a defendant commits an offense that results in great
harm, the system need not treat him as seriously as the resulting
harm if that defendant, for whatever reason, does not pose a danger
to society.153 It is here that defendants charged with possessing child
pornography try to make their case.154 They argue that their offense—
if proven—is not serious, and that they themselves are not dangerous,
because: (1) they have simply viewed pictures in the privacy of their
own home and have never actually harmed a real child;155 (2) they
have no criminal history and are otherwise law-abiding, upstanding
citizens;156 and (3) they will never engage in this conduct again.157
Based on recent statistics showing district court judges sentenc-
ing defendants far below the Sentencing Guidelines range, many
people want to believe this argument.158 The problem, however, is
that the offense is serious because it does result in great harm, and
thus the individuals who commit these offenses are dangerous.
1. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, They Have Viewed “Crime Scene Photographs” of
Real Children Suffering Real Harm159
a. Real Children, Real Harm
Legally, what is child pornography? When we hear the term, we
often think of an eighteen-year-old girl dressed to look younger in
a Catholic school girl uniform, or we fear that we will be prosecuted
152. Cotton, supra note 118, at 1318.
153. Id.
154. Alexandra Gelber, Assistant Deputy Chief, Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Response to “A Reluctant Rebellion” 5 (July 1, 2009),
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/ceos/ReluctantRebellionResponse.pdf (citing Hansen,
supra note 15, at 56).
155. United States v. Goff, 501 F.3d 250, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).
156. See Hansen, supra note 15, at 54, 57 (describing defendant Jon Hanson).
157. See Muller, supra note 74, at 46 (discussing defendants who scored low on the Risk
Prediction Index (RPI) for repeated offenses based in part on employment, education, and
prior criminal history factors).
158. Efrati, supra note 1.
159. Ernie Allen, President & CEO, Nat’l Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children, State-
ment at United States Sentencing Commission Regional Hearing on the 25th Anniversary
of the Passage of the Sentencing Act of 1984 2 (Oct. 20, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/
AGENDAS/20091020/Allen_testimony.pdf [hereinafter Sentencing Commission Hearing].
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for the picture we took of our newborn baby taking his first bath.
Neither image constitutes child pornography.160
Title 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4) makes it illegal in part for any per-
son to: (1) knowingly possess; (2) one or more matters containing a
visual depiction; (3) that has been transported in interstate commerce,
including by computer, or that has been produced using materials
that have been; (4) if the visual depiction is of, and was produced
using, a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.161
A minor is defined as someone less than eighteen years old.162
The minor must be a real child, and cannot be a digitally created
image.163 “ ‘[S]exually explicit conduct’ means actual or simulated—
(i) sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-
genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or oppo-
site sex; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic
abuse; or (v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any
person . . . .”164 Factually, this means that child pornography con-
sists of pictures of real children suffering real sexual abuse.
“In the 1970’s and 80’s, the typical sexually abusive images of
children involved photos of nude children in sexual poses.”165 Unfor-
tunately, the children in these images are becoming younger and
younger, and the images more graphic and violent.166
According to data from the National Center for Missing &
Exploited Children, 83% of defendants charged with child pornogra-
phy possess pornographic images of prepubescent children.167 Of
these, 19% possess images of children younger than three years old
and 39% possess images of children younger than six years old.168
A study of all national arrests for possession of child pornography
in 2000 found that 80% of defendants possessed images graphically
depicting sexual penetration.169 Twenty-one percent possessed “images
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2006) (giving the definition of “child pornography”).
161. Id. § 2252(a)(4).
162. Id. § 2256(1).
163. See id. § 2256(9) (defining an “identifiable minor” as a real person).
164. Id. § 2256(2)(A).
165. Gelber, supra note 154, at 1.
166. Id.
167. Combating Child Pornography by Eliminating Pornographers’ Access to the
Financial Payment System: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Ernie Allen, President & CEO, National
Center for Missing & Exploited Children) [hereinafter Bank Hearing] available at http://
www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/NewsEventServlet?LanguageCoutnry=en
_US&PageId=2792; Rogers, supra note 4, at 852.
168. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
169. JANIS WOLAK ET AL., CHILD PORNOGRAPHY POSSESSORS ARRESTED IN INTERNET-
RELATED CRIMES: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ONLINE JUVENILE VICTIMIZATION STUDY
vii (2005), http://www.missingkids.com/en_US/publications/NC144.pdf.
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depicting sexual violence to children such as bondage, rape, and tor-
ture.”170 Additionally, “39% had at least 1 video with moving images
of child pornography.”171
The abuse that young children endure in the pornographic
images affects them both physically and emotionally. Due to their
small size, children often suffer severe physical injuries when they
are victims of the sexual abuse that is portrayed in pornographic
images. One looks no further than case law to see this harm. In State
v. Kennedy, the eight-year-old victim suffered profuse vaginal bleed-
ing, “[h]er entire perineum was torn and her rectum protruded into
her vagina.”172 In State v. Mundt, the seven-year-old victim’s “vaginal
walls were ‘very abraded’ and had lacerations extending ‘practically
the full length of the vaginal canal’ and ‘all the way through the side
walls of the vagina’ on either side.”173 In State v. Smith, “[i]t took
more than an hour of surgery to repair some of the physical injuries”
suffered by the six-year-old victim.174 In State v. Goodwin, the seven-
year-old victim suffered “a severe laceration in the vaginal area ex-
tending all the way to the cervix,” requiring major surgery and mak-
ing it questionable whether the victim would ever be able to engage
in normal sexual intercourse or have children of her own.175
In addition to physical harm, victims may experience psychologi-
cal problems, including “sudden school failure, unprovoked crying,
dissociation, depression, insomnia, sleep disturbances, nightmares,
feelings of guilt and inferiority, and self-destructive behavior, includ-
ing an increased incidence of suicide.”176
In addition, one study has “estimated that as many as 40% of




172. 957 So. 2d 757, 760-61 (La. 2007), quoted in Brief for U.S. Representatives Lamar
Smith et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 16, United States v. Farley, No.
08-15882-BB (11th Cir. Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].
173. 873 N.E.2d 828, 832, 844 (Ohio 2007) (quoting testimony of the urologist who
assisted in the victim’s autopsy), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 16.
174. 909 P.2d 236, 238-39 (Utah 1995), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
172, at 16.
175. 679 P.2d 231, 232, 234 (Mont. 1984), quoted in Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
172, at 16.
176. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677 (2008) modified on denial of reh’g, 129
S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Melissa Meister, Note, Murdering Innocence:
The Constitutionality of Child Rape Statutes, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 197, 209 (2003); J. Richard
Broughton, “On Horror’s Head Horrors Accumulate”: A Reflective Comment on Capital
Child Rape Legislation, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 38 (2000); Yale Glazer, Child Rapists Beware!
The Death Penalty and Louisiana’s Amended Aggravated Rape Statute, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 79, 88 (1997)).
177. Id. at 2677 (citing A. Lurigio, M. Jones, & B. Smith, Child Sexual Abuse: Its
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b. The Harm Continues Beyond the Sexual Abuse Itself
Unique to this offense, the harm that a victim suffers continues
far beyond the sexual abuse itself. Unlike traditional crimes in which
the harm results from the crime committed and may continue with
the victim’s recollection of that crime thereafter, the victim of child
pornography offenses is abused in the making of the images them-
selves, but is also re-victimized each time the image is viewed.178
The victims feel just as strongly about the individuals who are
looking at—and enjoying—the abuse they have endured as they feel
toward the person who made the pornographic image itself. One vic-
tim has said, “ ‘[i]t terrifies me that people enjoy viewing things like
this . . . . [E]ven though I don’t know them, they are hurting me still.
They have exploited me in the most horrible way.’ ”179 Another victim
has stated:
Usually, when a kid is hurt and the abuser goes to prison, the
abuse is over. But because [the defendant] put my pictures on
the Internet the abuse is still going on. Anyone can see them.
People are still downloading them . . . I’m more upset about the
pictures on the Internet than I am about what [the defendant] did
to me physically.180
These feelings are not surprising given that “a significant part
of the healing process for children traumatized by sexual abuse is
the ability to control the disclosure of the abuse.”181 Victims, who pre-
viously felt powerless, “may feel empowered by choosing when, how,
and to whom to disclose their abusive experiences.”182 “[C]hildren
whose pornographic images are circulated online” lose control over
the disclosure.183
“The repeated distribution and possession of child pornography . . .
re-victimizes children and exposes them to further shame and humil-
iation and the attendant physical and mental ramifications.”184 The
Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Probation Practice, 59 FED. PROBATION 69,
70 (1995).
178. Rogers, supra note 4, at 853.
179. Gelber, supra note 154, at 3 (quoting a child pornography victim).
180. Id. (quoting a victim of child pornography) (alterations in original).
181. Sentencing Commission Hearing, supra note 159, at 13 (citing ETHEL QUAYLE ET




184. Id. (citing NAT’L SOC’Y FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO CHILDREN, IMAGES
OF ABUSE: A REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE ON CHILD PORNOGRAPHY (2006), http://www.nspcc
.org.uk/Inform/publications/downloads/imagesofabuse_wdf48065.pdf).
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harm that victims endure during the abuse continues every day of
their lives. This harm should not be ignored.
In addition to the harm associated with each viewing, the victims
often suffer physical and emotional harm long after the actual abuse
is over.
An amici curiae brief filed in the Northern District of Georgia by
certain Republican Representatives on the Judiciary Committee lays
out in detail the social science evidence demonstrating that “[s]exually
[a]bused [c]hildren [s]uffer [s]evere [p]sychological, [s]ocial, and [c]og-
nitive [p]roblems that [l]ast [l]ong into [a]dulthood.”185
Resulting psychological problems include “ ‘multiple personality
disorder, refractory psychosis, borderline personality disorder, soma-
toform disorder, and panic disorder.’ ”186 Victims of child sexual abuse
often experience depression as an adult.187 In addition, one survey has
found that there is “a twofold increased risk for suicide attempts.”188
A strong link also exists between childhood victims and post trau-
matic stress disorder later in life.189
As Justice Alito noted in United States v. Kennedy, the social
problems resulting from child sexual abuse “often become society’s
problems as well,” in the form of later “substance abuse, dangerous
sexual behaviors or dysfunction, inability to relate to others on an
interpersonal level, and psychiatric illness.”190
For example, “[v]ictims of child rape are nearly 5 times more
likely than nonvictims to be arrested for sex crimes and nearly 30
times more likely to be arrested for prostitution.”191 In addition,
“ ‘women who report child sexual abuse are at greater risk during
adolescence of sexually transmitted diseases, teenage pregnancy, mul-
tiple sexual partnerships, and sexual revictimisation.’ ”192 Further,
185. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 6.
186. Id. at 7 (quoting Yutaka Ito et al., Preliminary Evidence for Aberrant Cortical
Development in Abused Children: A Quantitative EEG Study, 10 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY
& CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 298, 298 (1998) and citing Elliot C. Nelson et al., Association
Between Self-reported Childhood Sexual Abuse and Adverse Psychological Outcomes,
59 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 139, 139 (2002)).
187. Id. at 8 (quoting Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., The Impact of Sexual Abuse
on Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL.
164, 175 (1993)).
188. Id. at 9 (quoting Sharon R. Dube et al., Long-Term Consequences of Childhood
Sexual Abuse by Gender of Victim, 28 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 430, 433 (2005)).
189. Id. at 9-10 (quoting Joan Archart-Treichel, Dissociation Often Precedes PTSD in
Sexually Abused Children, 40 PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 34, 34 (2005) and citing Cathy Spatz
Widom, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Abused and Neglected Children Grown Up, 156
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1223, 1223 (1999)).
190. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2677 (2008) modified on denial of reh’g 129
S. Ct. 1 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
191. Id. (citation omitted).
192. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 172, at 13 (quoting Paul E. Mullen & Jillian
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“children who have been sexually abused are disproportionately vic-
tims of rape and sexual assault as adults.”193
Women who were sexually abused as a child have higher rates
of alcohol abuse than women who were not abused, and those who
were abused “ ‘were roughly three times more likely than unabused
girls to report drug dependence as adults.’ ”194 Even accounting for
women who grew up in lower socioeconomic status homes, women
who were sexually abused as children were more likely to find them-
selves in the lowest socioeconomic status categories than women who
were not abused.195
In addition to the resulting psychological, social, and health
problems, studies also show that many child abuse victims suffer
neurological damage from the abuse, which causes lifelong cognitive
problems.196
2. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, the Crime Provides a Demand That Fuels
Worldwide Supply
In addition to the abuse endured during the making of the por-
nographic image and the harm a victim suffers with each new view-
ing, the offense of possessing child pornography presents a third
harm, unique to it. Each time an individual possesses child pornog-
raphy, he provides a demand that fuels supply—and with supply,
more and more children are abused.197
A 2006 report by McKinsey Worldwide projected that “commercial
child pornography is a multi-billion-dollar industry worldwide.”198
With the potential to make large amounts of money, many are pro-
ducing child pornography for the market.199 They create child por-
nography because it is profitable to do so.200
Fleming, Long-term Effects of Child Sexual Abuse, 9 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION
7 (1998)).
193. Id. at 9.
194. Id. at 12 (quoting K. S. Kendler et al., Childhood Sexual Abuse and Adult
Psychiatric and Substance Use Disorders in Women: An Epidemiological and Co-twin
Control Analysis, 57 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 953, 959 (2000)).
195. Id. (citing Paul E. Mullen & Jillian Fleming, Long-term Effects of Child Sexual
Abuse, 9 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE PREVENTION 5 (1998)).
196. Id. at 10 (citing Carryl P. Navalta et al., Effects of Childhood Sexual Abuse on
Neuropsychological and Cognitive Function in College Women, 18 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY
& CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCES 45, 45 (2006)).
197. Gelber, supra note 154, at 4 (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1990)).
198. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
199. See Gelber, supra note 154, at 4 (describing a website operator who created child
pornography for his customers).
200. Id.
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One example illustrating the demand involves a commercial on-
line child pornography enterprise. In that prosecution, investigators
identified 70,000 customers who were using a credit card to pay $29.95
a month to access graphic child pornography images.201
The demand exists worldwide. An example of the market’s world-
wide span can be found in the prosecution of the Regpay Company,
“a major Internet processor of subscriptions for third-party commer-
cial child pornography websites.” 202 The Regpay site “was managed
in Belarus, the credit card payments were processed by a company in
Florida, the money was deposited in a bank in Latvia, and the major-
ity of the almost 300,000 credit card transactions on the sites were
from Americans.” 203
Even when money is not involved, many are producing child por-
nography in response to a demand for new material. Law enforce-
ment has discovered pedophile website communities where, to be
accepted into the online community, an individual needs to submit
a new photograph or videotape of child pornography; in other words,
an applicant seeking membership must produce new child pornog-
raphy that no one has ever seen before.204
Unfortunately, it is clear a market exists that “constantly de-
mands that more children be abused in order to create new images,”
and that supply is meeting that demand.205 Ignoring the seriousness
of this offense allows this horrific market to continue to grow un-
abated, making cruel predators rich at the expense of our children
and creating more and more child abuse victims.
3. Possessors of Child Pornography Have Not Passively
Viewed Innocuous Pictures in the Privacy of Their Homes;
Instead, the Possessor Himself Has Suffered a Deleterious
Effect from Viewing the Images
Viewing child pornography harms not only the child abused, but
the defendant himself. Michael Bourke and Dr. Andres Hernandez,
Director of the Federal Sex Offender Treatment Program, note that
viewing child pornography has an injurious effect on the viewer by
normalizing adult/child sexuality, by dehumanizing children, and
201. Bank Hearing, supra note 167.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. See 4 Arrested During Child Porn Raids, WSBTV.COM, Nov. 30, 2009, http://www
.wsbtv.com/news/21726107/detail.html (noting that one website requires members to post
their own content as part of their membership).
205. Gelber, supra note 154, at 4.
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by desensitizing the viewer “to the harmful consequences of child vic-
timization.” 206 They report that they have never seen a defendant who
has not experienced these effects after viewing child pornography.207
The desensitization that occurs from viewing the images also con-
tinues in internet communities where possessors provide each other
with a sense of community and give each other validation that their
interest in children is normal.208 They also encourage each other to
act out on their interests.209 This message “erodes the societal mores
which could otherwise inhibit them from satisfying that impulse.” 210
These effects should not be ignored.
4. Possessors of Child Pornography Oftentimes Use the
Images Against Other Children
A fourth harm also results from this offense. Not only are the
child victims of sexual abuse harmed by their pornographic images,
but defendants often use these images to abuse even more children.
Michael J. Heimbach of the FBI testified to Congress on May 1, 2002
that defendants will show child pornography to children to demon-
strate sexual acts to them, to lower their sexual inhibitions, and to
desensitize them to sex.211 In addition, defendants may also use the
images to blackmail a victim child into not disclosing the images or
into engaging in additional sexual acts with the adult.212
5. Child Pornography Possessors’ Lack of Criminal History Is
Not Proof That They Are Not Dangerous
A common argument that a defendant charged with possessing
child pornography asserts during his initial appearance is that he has
no criminal history.213 The argument goes, then, that his actions in
this case constitute an isolated incident and that he poses no danger
206. Michael L. Bourke & Andres E. Hernandez, The ‘Butner Study’ Redux: A Report
of the Incidence of Hands-on Child Victimization by Child Pornography Offenders, 24
J. FAM. VIOLENCE 183, 188 (2009).
207. Id.
208. Gelber, supra note 154, at 5.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Enhancing Child Protection Laws After April 16, 2002 Supreme Court Decision,
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 9-10 (2002) (statement
of Michael J. Heimbach, Unit Chief, Crimes Against Children Unit, Criminal Investigative
Division, FBI).
212. Id. at 10.
213. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6.
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to society.214 Judges rely heavily on this argument when deciding
whether to detain a defendant or how to treat him while he is on
pretrial release.215
The problem with this argument is that the defendant’s asser-
tion does not correctly lead to the conclusion; that is, just because a
defendant has no reported prior criminal history does not mean that
his charged conduct, if proven, is an isolated act and that he does not
pose a danger to society. What it does mean is that the defendant
may simply have never been caught.
The fact that the defendant previously may have not been caught
is not surprising given how difficult it is to catch someone commit-
ting this offense in their own home on their own computer, and, if the
defendant did engage in a hands-on offense, the vast majority of child
victims keep their abuse silent.216
In addition to all the crimes we never learn about, the one crime,
if proven, for which the defendant has been charged illustrates that
he in fact does have a criminal history. Given that the above-described
harms occur with each separate possession and viewing, a defendant
who has hundreds, if not thousands of images has committed the
offense a commensurate number of times. Ernie Allen has testified
that “the reviews conducted by NCMEC at law enforcement’s request
demonstrate that many offenders set about building libraries of child
pornography images with each single image representing the sexual
exploitation of one or more children.” 217 In other words, the defen-
dant’s actions in the charged case show that he has recidivated hun-
dreds, if not thousands, of times. These crimes are not counted as
prior criminal history, however, because they are tried in one case
for judicial efficiency.218
As one commentator has noted, “the lack of a criminal history
[often] hides years of systemic criminal behavior. The defendants
simply had never been caught,” and “[t]hat their fall from grace may
have been more dramatic than other criminals does not mitigate the
seriousness of the crime.” 219
214. Id.
215. See discussion supra Part I.B (considering the dangerousness of the defendant as
a factor in pretrial release under the Bail Reform Act of 1984).
216. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6.
217. Sentencing Commission Hearing, supra note 159, at 4.
218. Similarly, the criminal justice system typically does not treat a defendant’s com-
mission of new offenses while on pretrial release towards his recidivism rate. Studies
examining sex offender recidivism rates measure recidivism by looking at re-arrest or new
convictions. Muller, supra note 74, at 46. Often defendants who commit new offenses while
on pretrial release would not be classified as recidivists, however. Because the new activ-
ities they engaged in on pretrial release were not charged as separate offenses, this new
activity was simply used as another factor to account for at sentencing. Id. at 45.
219. Gelber, supra note 154, at 6-7.
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6. Disturbing New Evidence Links Defendants Who Possess
Child Pornography to Those Who Commit Hands-On
Offenses
As explained above, possession of child pornography is a serious
offense in and of itself, regardless of whether the possessor has ever
molested an actual child. Disturbing new evidence, though, continues
to emerge illustrating that possessors have, more likely than not,
molested a real child.
In a recent study, researchers set out to determine whether con-
victed possessors of child pornography posed little risk for engaging in
hands-on offenses or if they were contact sex offenders whose criminal
sexual behavior had never been detected.220
They studied 155 defendants who were convicted in federal court
of possessing child pornography.221 They divided the offenders into
two groups:
men whose known sexual offense history at the time of judicial
sentencing involved the possession, receipt, or distribution of child
abuse images, but did not include any “hands-on” sexual abuse; and
men convicted of similar offenses who had documented histories
of hands-on sexual offending against at least one child victim.222
The subjects completed questionnaires regarding their sexual
histories when they began treatment and every six months there-
after.223 In addition, each participant voluntarily underwent a poly-
graph examination.224 Researchers compared the number of known
hands-on victims reported in the sentencing documents with the num-
ber ultimately disclosed after at least six months of treatment.225
“At the time of sentencing, 115 (74%) subjects had no documented
hands-on victims. Forty (26%) had known histories of abusing a
child via a hands-on sexual act.” 226 There were 75 known victims at
the time of sentencing averaging 1.88 victims per offenders.227
“By the end of treatment . . . 131 subjects (85%) admitted they
had at least one hands-on sexual offense, a 59% increase in the num-
ber of subjects with known hands-on offenses.” 228 Also by the end of
220. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 183.
221. Id. at 185-86.
222. Id. at 183.
223. Id. at 186.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 187.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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treatment, the number of reported victims was 1777, averaging 13.56
victims per offender.229 Dramatically, the acknowledged number of
sexual contact offenses increased by 2369%.230
“[O]f the 24 subjects . . . who denied they committed a hands-on
offense at the end of treatment, nine were polygraphed, and only two
‘passed.’ ” 231 That means that “less than 2% of subjects who entered
treatment without known hands-on offenses were verified to be ‘just
pictures’ cases.” 232 “[B]oth of these offenders remarked that while they
had not molested a child prior to their arrest for the instant offense,”
they would have been at risk for doing so had they had the access
and opportunity.233
Based on these findings, the researchers questioned “whether
it is pragmatically, not to mention theoretically, useful to discrim-
inate between ‘child pornographers’ and ‘child abusers’ or even
‘pedophiles.’ ” 234
7. All Three Branches of the Federal Government Have
Recognized These Harms
All three branches of federal government have recognized that
children depicted in pornographic images can suffer severe physical
and emotional harm, that the harm continues with each separate view-
ing, that demand fuels supply, that child pornography possessors are
encouraged to act out on their desires by viewing the pornographic
images, and that possessors use the contraband to harm even more
children.
In passing the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Con-
gress found that “[t]he use of children as subjects of pornographic
materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and mental health
of the child,” 235 and that “[c]hild pornography stimulates the sexual
229. Id.
230. Id. at 188.
231. Id.
232. Bourke & Hernandez, supra note 206, at 188.
233. Id.
234. Id. Similarly, a 1980 study by the Chicago Police Department found that in almost
100% of their annual child pornography arrests, officers found visual media depicting the
defendant engaging in sex with real children. Stephen T. Fairchild, Note, Protecting the
Least of These: A New Approach to Child Pornography Pandering Provisions, 57 DUKE
L.J. 163, 168 (2007) (quoting Stopping Child Pornography: Protecting our Children and
the Constitution: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 60-61
(2002) (statement of Ernest E. Allen, President and Chief Exec. Officer of the Nat’l Ctr.
for Missing & Exploited Children, and Daniel S. Armagh, Dir. of the Legal Res. Div., Nat’l
Ctr. for Missing & Exploited Children)).
235. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 14 (1996) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758
(1982)).
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appetites and encourages the activities of child molesters and pedo-
philes, who use it to feed their sexual fantasies.” 236 Congress further
found that, “[c]hild molesters and pedophiles use child pornography
to convince potential victims that the depicted sexual activity is a
normal practice; that other children regularly participate in sexual
activities with adults or peers.” 237
In recently passing the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act on July 27, 2006, Congress noted that, “[e]very instance of view-
ing images of child pornography represents a renewed violation of the
privacy of the victims and a repetition of their abuse.” 238
Likewise, the Supreme Court has recognized that, “[b]ecause the
child’s actions are reduced to a recording, the pornography may haunt
him in future years, long after the original misdeed took place”;239 and
that “the distribution network for child pornography must be closed
if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation
of children is to be effectively controlled.” 240
Through the Department of Justice, the executive branch on
February 15, 2006, announced the initiation of Project Safe Child-
hood.241 With this initiative, the Justice Department allocated more
than $14 million to the Internet Crimes Against Children Program,
which is comprised nationally of 46 regional task forces, to better coor-
dinate partnerships between state, local, and federal law enforcement
in prosecuting child exploitation offenses.242 The Justice Department
stated one of its goals is to have “[i]ncreased federal involvement in
child pornography and enticement cases,” and that “[g]iven the bene-
ficial investigative tools and stiffer punishment available under fed-
eral law, U.S. Attorneys and the federal investigative agencies will
be expected to increase the number of sexual exploitation investi-
gations and prosecutions.” 243
Thus, it is accepted by all three branches of the federal govern-
ment that defendants’ arguments as to why they are not dangerous,
and relatedly, why there is little to no harm from their offense, hold no
merit. These defendants are dangerous and the harm resulting from
their offense is grave, and therefore, it is apparent that society needs
236. Id. at 12.
237. Id. at 13-14.
238. Adam Walsh Child Protection Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 501(2)(D),
120 Stat. 587, 624 (2006).
239. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982) (citing David P. Shouvlin,
Preventing the Sexual Exploitation of Children: A Model Act, 17 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
535, 545 (1981)).
240. Id.
241. FACT SHEET, supra note 18.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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to be protected from this offense. Accordingly, the criminal justice
system’s incapacitation-based treatment of that defendant must be
tailored to the harm.
The next question, then, is how much protection is needed. In
other words, what constitutes proportional pretrial treatment of a
defendant whose alleged actions result in the harm previously de-
scribed? In addressing this question, Congress should weigh the of-
fense’s resulting harm against the statute’s costs and burdens. In
doing so, Congress must necessarily make public policy decisions
as to what weight to assign both elements. If the benefit of amend-
ing the statute outweighs the costs and burdens of doing so, the Bail
Reform Act should be amended so as to fully achieve its incapacitation-
based goals.
C. Weighing the Offense’s Resulting Harm Against the Statute’s
Costs and Burdens
As already explained, the harms resulting from possession of
child pornography—harms to the individual victim portrayed in the
abuse, to future victims, to society at large, and even to defendants
themselves—are great; indeed, very few criminal offenses carry
greater harm.
After recognizing this harm and society’s need for protection,
the benefit of protection should be weighed against the statute’s costs
and burdens. The costs and burdens consist mainly of the burdens to
defendants, both wrongly and correctly charged, and to the criminal
justice system’s credibility if society does not approve of the system’s
pretrial treatment.
In weighing these two elements, policy decisions ultimately dic-
tate the end result. For example, a minor shoplifter with a high risk
of flight may flee unless bail is high, but the burdens of high bail or
pretrial detention may outweigh this risk.244 Conversely, a harm that
is not likely to occur, but which is very serious, may outweigh the
burdens of conditional bail or detention.245
Each category of costs and burdens is discussed below, with each
discussion weighing the particular cost and burden with society’s need
for protection.
244. Frase, supra note 121, at 604.
245. Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment, Predictions of Dangerousness and Washington’s
Sexually Violent Predator Statute, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 277, 298 (1992) (“[A] harm which
is not likely to occur but which is very serious may add up to dangerousness,” whereas
“a trivial harm even though it is likely to occur, might not add up to dangerousness.”)
(quoting SEYMOUR HALLECK, THE MENTALLY DISORDERED OFFENDER 85 U.S. Dep’t. of
Health & Human Serv. Pub. No. 86-1471 (1974)).
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1. Weighing Possession of Child Pornography’s Resulting
Harms Against the Bail Reform Act’s Costs and Burdens
to a Defendant
a. Costs and Burdens to Defendants Wrongly Charged
Defendants who are wrongly charged with possessing child por-
nography obviously face a great cost while awaiting trial, whether they
are released or detained. Unfortunately, however, this is true for all
defendants wrongly charged with an offense, whatever that offense
may be. Our system is not perfect; it is a tragedy that sometimes
innocent people are charged with crimes they did not commit. Hope-
fully our system discovers this mistake and the innocent walk free.
The Supreme Court, although recognizing that simply because
a defendant has been charged with an offense does not mean that
the defendant committed the offense, still found, in United States v.
Salerno,246 that a defendant’s substantive due process rights are not
violated by pretrial detention because this detention does not consti-
tute impermissible punishment; in fact, the Court stated, pretrial
detention is not punishment at all, but instead serves only to further
the government’s legitimate regulatory interest in preventing danger
to society.247
In determining whether the Act’s restriction on liberty consti-
tuted punishment or legitimate, nonpunitive regulation, the Court
first looked to Congressional intent.248 It concluded that Congress
“perceived pretrial detention as a potential solution to a pressing soci-
etal problem,” and that there was “no doubt that preventing danger
to the community is a legitimate regulatory goal.” 249
The Court further found that the government’s regulatory inter-
est in protecting society can, at times, outweigh a defendant’s liberty
interest and, here, the authorized pretrial detention was not exces-
sive in relation to the regulatory goal.250 This is true because the Act
carefully limits detention to the most serious of crimes, affords defen-
dants a prompt detention hearing, and the Speedy Trial Act limits
the maximum length of pretrial detention.251
In addition, “the Government must convince a neutral decision-
maker by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release
246. 481 U.S. 739 (1987).
247. Id. at 747 (citation omitted).
248. Id. (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
249. Id. (citation omitted).
250. Id. at 748, 750-51.
251. Id. at 747.
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can reasonably assure the safety of the community or any person.” 252
The Court concluded that, “[u]nder these narrow circumstances, soci-
ety’s interest in crime prevention is at its greatest,” 253 and the gov-
ernment’s “concern for the safety and indeed the lives of its citizens”
authorized the Bail Reform Act of 1984.254
Furthermore, the Bail Reform Act requires the district court to
consider “the weight of the evidence” against the defendant when de-
termining how to treat a defendant pretrial.255 Thus, if the evidence
against a defendant is weak, the court is required to factor that con-
sideration into its pretrial decisionmaking.
In the end, the costs and burdens to a defendant wrongly charged
with possessing child pornography are the same as the costs and bur-
dens to defendants wrongly charged with any offense. The statute is
designed to account for these costs and burdens, and therefore, they
do not alter the analysis presented here.
b. Costs and Burdens to Defendants Correctly Charged
The correctly charged defendant is also burdened by pretrial
treatment to the extent that the treatment is not commensurate to
the risk he poses of committing the offense while on pretrial release.
Also, if a defendant poses no risk, but is incarcerated anyway, his
burden is great. Similarly, if he poses no risk but is subject to man-
datory release conditions, he suffers a burden.
In attempting to predict a correctly charged defendant’s propen-
sity for future criminal activity, two approaches are used: clinical
prediction and actuarial prediction.256 Clinical predictions are made
by psychologists, psychiatrists, parole boards, and judges, all of whom
analyze the defendant personally.257 Actuarial, or statistical, prediction
relies on explicit rules that list risk factors, weigh each factor, and then
mathematically combine these numbers to yield an objective measure
of violence risk.258 Actuarial prediction has been proven to be a more
accurate, and thus preferred, method of prediction.259 Nevertheless,
252. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
253. Id.
254. Id. at 755.
255. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(2).
256. Monahan, supra note 149, at 405.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 405-06 (citing Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting
Behavior with Statistical Inference and Individualized Judgement, 88 YALE L.J. 1408,
1420-22 (1979)).
259. Id. at 408 (citing William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of
Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction
Procedures: The Clinical-Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUBL. POL’Y & L. 293 (1996)).
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“[i]t has been widely accepted for some time that predictions of an
individual’s likelihood of committing future serious violent crime are
only one-third accurate.” 260
Even in the face of generally accepted views that we cannot al-
ways accurately predict the likelihood that a defendant will commit
future crimes, the Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, a federal
government agency tasked with managing and regulating federal
detention programs, with support from the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts, recently sponsored a study to identify rele-
vant predictors of pretrial outcomes so as to better identify which
federal defendants “are most suited for pretrial release,” and to de-
velop a risk classification scheme to rate the risk a defendant poses
if released pending trial.261
The study found that nine factors are statistically significant
in predicting pretrial risk:
(1) whether there were other charges pending against the defen-
dant at the time of arrest, (2) the number of prior misdemeanor
arrests, (3) the number of prior felony arrests, (4) the number of
prior failures to appear, (5) whether the defendant was em-
ployed at the time of arrest, (6) the defendant’s residency status,
(7) whether the defendant suffered from substance abuse prob-
lems, (8) the nature of the primary charge, and (9) whether the
primary charge was a misdemeanor or felony.262
Weights were then assigned to these nine factors.263 On a scale
from one to five, defendants classified as risk level one posed the least
risk for pretrial failure, while defendants classified as risk level five
posed the greatest risk.264
Eighty-seven percent of defendants in the lowest risk category
were released pending trial.265 They had a 97.7 percent success rate,
and were thus concluded to be “the best candidates for release.” 266
The study also found that pretrial release conditions generally did
not increase these defendants’ success level, and in some cases in-
creased the risk of pretrial failure.267
260. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 293-94 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 47 U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Services Pub. No.
81-921 (1981)).
261. Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, PreTrial Risk Assessment in the Federal
Court, 73 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (2009).
262. Id. at 5.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 19.
266. Id.
267. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 19.
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“Sixty-two percent of all defendants classified in level 2 were
released pending trial,” and those released had an average pretrial
success rate of ninety-four percent.268 The study concluded that
“[d]efendants classified as level 2 are good candidates for release,
yet, similar to risk level 1, [pretrial release conditions] . . . generally
do[ ] not increase success and in some cases increases the risk of
pretrial failure.” 269
Less than half of all defendants classified as risk level three were
released pending trial and those who were “had an average success
rate of 90.8 percent.” 270 Defendants who were subjected to release
conditions were more likely to be successful pending trial.271
Forty percent of defendants classified as risk level four were re-
leased pending trial and, of these, 88.2% completed pretrial release
successfully.272 Ninety-two percent of those released were subjected
to release conditions.273
Finally, “[a]pproximately 30 percent of the highest risk defen-
dants, risk level 5, were released pending trial,” with nearly all of
these defendants being subjected to pretrial release conditions.274
These “defendants had an average success rate of 84.5 percent.” 275
The study concluded that the majority of defendants charged
with federal crimes present a low risk of pretrial failure, meaning
that they are purportedly at low risk of committing an offense while
on pretrial release or of failing to appear in court on the presently
charged crime.276 Generally, sex crime defendants fall into a lower risk
category for which the study recommends pretrial release with no re-
lease conditions attached.277 The study admonishes that “[l]ower-risk
defendants are the most likely to succeed if released pending trial.
Release conditions that include alternatives to detention—with the
exception of mental health treatment, when appropriate—generally
decrease the likelihood of success for lower-risk defendants and should
be required sparingly.” 278
Several problems exist with this study. First, the defendants’






273. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 19.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Byrne, Lurigio & Pimentel, supra note 31, at 42 (citation omitted).
277. VanNostrand & Keebler, supra note 261, at 22.
278. Id. at 6.
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as low risk defendants.279 As explained above, however, the defen-
dant who views child pornography will often go undetected because
it is difficult to discover what someone is doing in their home and on
their computer.
In addition, the study fails to recognize the unique nature of
the possession of child pornography offense. Those who supervise de-
fendants charged with possessing child pornography caution against
the study’s conclusions for this subcategory of defendants.280 Address-
ing the study’s findings, a probation officer who deals with sex of-
fenders on pretrial release published an article alongside the study
urging restraint in applying the study’s findings to what he termed
the “special population” of federally charged sex offenders.281
In urging restraint, this probation officer provided specific
examples from his work of defendants continuing to reoffend while
on pretrial release. In one of his cases, a defendant faced with pos-
session of child pornography charges was found to possess more than
600 child pornographic images.282 “This defendant initially scored
a 1 on the [risk assessment test], was professionally employed, and
educated.” 283 The probation officer discovered chat logs on the de-
fendant’s computer that confirmed he had attempted to make online
contact with children while on pretrial release.284
Another example involved a defendant charged in the federal
District of New Jersey.285 The defendant was aware that his computer
activity was being monitored while on release, yet he chatted with an
individual who identified himself as a fifty-five-year-old convicted sex
offender.286 The two “exchanged stories of fantasy rape of children
and subsequently exchanged images of child pornography.” 287 The
probation officer went to the defendant’s home and discovered numer-
ous images of child pornography.288 The defendant scored a zero on
a risk assessment test, “was educated, employed, and had no prior
criminal history.” 289
Given both of these defendants’ assessed risk levels, the study
would have recommended that judges release them pretrial with no
279. See id. at 12-13 (discussing the increased likelihood of pretrial failure if defendants
had prior arrests and the use of this factor in assigning defendants a risk category).
280. Muller, supra note 74, at 45.
281. Id.
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release conditions attached. We would not have known of the defen-
dants’ continued criminal activity, however, but for the release condi-
tions that were imposed.290 In the end, at best, the correctly-charged
defendant’s risk level is unknown.
Next, in weighing the harm against the unknown risk, public
policy decisions must be made. As recognized above, most commen-
tators accept that predictions of future criminal activity are approxi-
mately one-third accurate.291 Bochnewich argues, however, that those
who say these numbers mandate abandoning preventive detention
from our criminal justice system are incorrect.
First, she says critics are incorrect because assuming that a two-
thirds false positive is inadequate unfairly incorporates our legal stan-
dards of proof into what is, essentially, policy making.292 Deciding
what level of risk a defendant must present in determining how to
treat a defendant pretrial is a question of public policy, and this public
policy determination is unfettered by legal constraints and standards
established by probable cause, reasonable doubt, reasonable proba-
bility, and the like.293
Next, she asserts critics of pretrial detention are incorrect because
“some of the ‘false positives’ are actually true positives, whose real
violent acts were undetected by authorities, unreported by the vic-
tims, or not prosecuted for a variety of reasons.” 294 Bochnewich cites
a study similar to the above-described Butner study, of defendants
prosecuted and convicted in Washington of child molestation.295 The
study found that although records uncovered a median of one victim
per defendant, the defendants reported in an anonymous survey that
they had a median of seven victims each.296 In terms of real numbers,
this translated to an increase from 136 known victims to 959 total vic-
tims.297 She concludes, therefore, that “there is compelling evidence
290. Id.
291. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 293-94 (citing JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL
PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR, 47 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Services Pub. No.
81-921 (1981)).
292. Id. at 295 (quoting Marc Miller & Norval Morris, Predictions of Dangerousness:
Ethical Concerns and Proposed Limits, 2 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 393,
424 & n.67 (1986)) (“We reject on logical grounds any tie between standard of proof and the
level of prediction necessary to justify preventive detention.”); see also John Monahan
& David Wexler, A Definite Maybe: Proof and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 37, 38 (1978) (discussing using standards of proof in predictions of
dangerousness).
293. Bochnewich, supra note 245, at 295-96 (citing Monahan & Wexler, supra note
292, at 37-39).
294. Id. at 296.
295. Id. at 296-97 (citing Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes
Committed by Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991)).
296. Id. at 297.
297. Id.
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that the widely accepted two-thirds ‘false positive’ incidence seriously
understates the rate of re-offense by convicted sex offenders.” 298
Even if we are to accept the two-thirds “false positive” analysis,
Congress should still decide that a defendant who poses a risk of com-
mitting additional child pornography offenses or engaging in a hands-
on sexual offense of a child while on pretrial release should be subject
to release conditions if released or a rebuttable presumption if the
government moves for detention because even if the risk is small,
a realized risk results in harm that is great. The question is, quite
simply: is it worth any risk to treat possession of child pornography
differently from other sex crimes against children? Given possession
of child pornography’s resulting harm, the answer should be a re-
sounding “no.”
2. Weighing Possession of Child Pornography’s Resulting
Harms Against the Bail Reform Act’s Costs and Burdens to
the Criminal Justice System Itself
Another cost or burden associated with a defendant’s pretrial
treatment is the system’s effect on public perception. Critics assert
that an incapacitation-based system is not fair because it treats people
based on what they might do and not on what they have done, and
treats people differently even though they have committed the same
offense, thereby leading to a loss in the public’s acceptance of, and
abidance by, the criminal justice system. Thus, this criticism speaks
directly to the costs and burdens associated with the criminal justice
system’s treatment of a defendant pretrial.
In support of retribution, and against incapacitation theory, Kant
wrote, “[p]unishment by a court . . . can never be inflicted merely as
a means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for
civil society. . . . For a man can never be treated merely as a means
to the purposes of another . . . .” 299 These same sentiments underlie
298. Id. at 298.
299. IMMANUEL KANT, METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge
University Press 1991) (1797), quoted in Andrew Strauss, Note, Losing Sight of the
Utilitarian Forest for the Retributivist Tress: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion
in a Utilitarian Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2002). Similarly,
Robinson and Darley argue that an incapacitation-based system is fundamentally flawed
because offenders are treated differently from what the community regards as just punish-
ment for the offense committed. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert,
91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 467-68 (1997). To support this argument, they state that this sys-
tem will assign different sentences to two individuals who commit the exact same crime,
that the offender is being punished for an action that he has not yet done, and that the
penalty is based on factors that are irrelevant to the community’s perception of an appro-
priate sentence, such as race, gender, and age. Id. at 468.
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the criticisms of preventive pretrial detention to protect society from
crimes committed by defendants on pretrial release.
Critics also argue that under an incapacitation-based system that
treats individual defendants based on predictions of future behavior,
defendants who commit the same offense will be treated differently.
Long writes:
I think the ultimate fault with selective incapacitation is its in-
compatibility with some basic values of a free, democratic society.
Selective incapacitation constitutes an illegitimate exercise of state
power because, its employment, and specifically its appeal to pre-
dictions of individual dangerousness, results in something other
than equal, just, and uniform treatment of criminal offenders in
particular, and of citizens in general.300
As a result of these two assertions, Robinson and Darley con-
clude that, “an incapacitation-based sentencing system undercuts the
moral credibility of the criminal law . . . .” 301 According to Robinson
and Darley, our criminal justice system maintains credibility, and, as
a result, is able to help build, shape, and maintain society’s norms and
principles, only when it criminalizes and punishes offenses which de-
serve moral condemnation.302 If our system does not reflect the com-
munity’s perception of “moral blameworthiness,” then our system is
no longer credible.303 Long has further asserted that “[c]itizens could
not unanimously recognize the legitimacy of state actions, policies, and
legal rules that treated some of them as mere means for the benefit
of others.” 304
Weighing the grave harm resulting from possession of child por-
nography offenses against this argued cost, however, does not defeat
an argument to amend the statute. This is true because the purported
“costs and burdens” are, in reality, not costs and burdens at all.
First, critics’ fear of dissimilar treatment for defendants who
commit similar offenses does not apply to the Bail Reform Act of
1984. The rebuttable presumption and mandatory release conditions
apply to all defendants charged with the enumerated offenses.305 So
all defendants, no matter their personal characteristics or history, are
subjected to a rebuttable presumption of detention and mandatory
300. Leonard J. Long, Rethinking Selective Incapacitation: More at Stake than Control-
ling Violent Crime, 62 UMKC L. REV. 107, 111 (1993) (citation omitted).
301. Robinson & Darley, supra note 299, at 468.
302. Id. at 477.
303. Id.
304. Long, supra note 300, at 142.
305. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e) (2006).
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release conditions if they have been charged with the enumerated
statutory offenses.
Second, the critics’ assertions fail because they completely dis-
regard the public’s true expectations and requirements of its criminal
justice system. The public wants and demands that the criminal jus-
tice system protect them and their family. These expectations are
heightened when the threat posed is to our children. If the criminal
justice system fails to meet this public demand, it is then that the
system loses its moral credibility and legitimacy.
Although Robinson and Darley’s proposition that “the criminal
law’s moral credibility is essential to effective crime control” and that
this credibility “is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability is
perceived as ‘doing justice,’ ” is true,306 their theory is deficient to the
extent that it ignores the public’s expectations of protection.
Indeed, these expectations are at the heart of the very reason
we have our government. Classical political philosophers cite to the
“State of Nature” as the reason individuals submit to governmental
authority, and John Locke’s arguments for the social contract were
extremely influential on the founding of this country.307 John Locke ex-
plained that the state of nature is the state of complete liberty to con-
duct one’s life as one wants, without any interference from others.308
Because the state of nature can dissolve into a state of war, however,
it is advantageous for individuals to contract together and form a civil
government.309 Government is formed only when individuals come
together and agree to relinquish their individual power to punish
those who transgress the “Law of Nature,” and to give that power to
a government.310 The government’s justification to exist is to protect
people’s property and well-being, and “when such protection is no
longer present . . . [citizens] have a right, if not an outright obligation,
to resist” the government.311
Thus the costs and burdens of amending the Bail Reform Act of
1984 to include possession of child pornography are nonexistent when
it comes to the effect an amendment would have on the criminal
justice system’s moral legitimacy. Indeed, it is only if the Act is not
amended that the criminal justice system’s moral legitimacy could
suffer. The offense’s resulting harm mandates that the statute be
306. Robinson & Darley, supra note 299, at 457.
307. Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory, THE INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
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amended to treat possession of child pornography similarly to the
other sex crimes against minors.
D. Analyzing Whether the Bail Reform Act of 1984 Treats
Possession of Child Pornography Consistently with Other
Crimes Resulting in the Same Harm
In addition to treating an offense in proportion to its harm, as
weighed against its costs and burdens, in order for an incarceration-
based statute to fully achieve its goals, it should treat similar offenses
consistently. By carving out possession of child pornography offenses
from other federal child exploitation offenses, the Bail Reform Act
of 1984 fails to treat similar harms similarly, and thus fails to fully
achieve its utilitarian, incapacitation-based goal. Two examples are
provided below.
First, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 classifies receipt of child
pornography as a rebuttable presumption offense and a mandatory-
release-condition offense.312 To violate the receipt statute, the defen-
dant must: (1) knowingly receive; (2) any visual depiction; (3) that
has been transported in interstate commerce, including by computer,
or that has been produced using materials that have been; (4) if the
visual depiction was produced using a minor engaging in sexually ex-
plicit conduct.313 The only difference between possessing child pornog-
raphy and receiving it are the elements “possession” versus “receipt”;
otherwise, the offenses are identical.314
The harm resulting from a defendant who commits the offense of
receiving child pornography and the resulting harm from a defendant
who possesses child pornography is the same. The only difference in
these two cases is a matter of proof. In one case, the prosecutor can
prove how, where, and when the defendant received the child pornog-
raphy, but in the other case, the government lacks this evidence. In
both scenarios, however, a child has been abused and that abuse is
portrayed in the images; the victim is revictimized by both defen-
dants; both defendants supply the demand that fuels the market; both
defendants suffer injurious effects themselves; and both defendants
can use the images to abuse more children.315 By treating offenses that
result in the exact same harm differently, the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fails to fully meet its underlying incapacitation-based purpose.
312. 18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e) (2006).
313. Id. § 2252(a)(2).
314. Compare id. § 2252(a)(2) (receipt of child pornography statute) with id. § 2252(a)(4)
(possession of child pornography statute).
315. See the discussion of harm caused by viewing images of child pornography supra
Part III.B and accompanying text.
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Another important point to note is that, by not including posses-
sion but by including receipt, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 rewards
the savvy defendant. Technology is becoming much more advanced
and defendants are able to wipe their hard drives clean, thereby elim-
inating evidence of when, where, and how they received the child por-
nography and thus inhibiting a prosecutor from being able to charge
and prove receipt. In contrast, the less savvy defendant will not elim-
inate the traces of when, where, and how he came to possess the child
pornography, and he will thus be charged with receipt, face a rebut-
table presumption at the bail hearing, and face mandatory release
conditions if he is released pretrial.
Similarly, if a defendant receives child pornography through the
mail, and if law enforcement finds the mailing envelope, prosecutors
can charge the defendant with receipt because the prosecutor can
prove where, when, and how the defendant came to possess the con-
traband. Here again, the savvy defendant may discard traces of his
receipt, but the less savvy defendant may not. Where receipt of child
pornography and possession of child pornography result in exactly
the same harm, the law should not reward the defendant who know-
ingly attempts to hide his crime. By doing so, we reward the defen-
dant who is arguably more dangerous.
Another example shows that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 treats
an offense resulting in arguably less harm—or, at the very least, the
same harm—more severely. Soliciting child pornography is included
in the rebuttable-presumption category of cases and in the mandatory-
release-condition category of cases.316 This offense makes it illegal in
part for any person who “advertises, promotes, presents, distributes,
or solicits . . . any material or purported material in a manner that
reflects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe,
that the material or purported material is, or contains” child pornog-
raphy.317 An individual violates this statute, then, if he advertises to
another person that he has child pornography to view or sell, even if
he does not. If a defendant is charged with such conduct, although
serious and rightly criminalized, the resulting harm from this action
is arguably less than the resulting crime of possessing actual child
pornography.
This is true because, with advertisement no child pornography
actually exists. Although the supply-and-demand harm is perpetu-
ated and a defendant may suffer certain injurious effects, such as
the belief that his desires are normal and socially acceptable, a real
316. Note the presence of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3) in the provisions of § 1342(c) and (e).
18 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (e).
317. Id. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
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child has not been abused to create the image and is not revictim-
ized with additional viewings. Consequently, the Act treats an offense
with arguably less harm more seriously than an offense with argu-
ably greater harm. Thus, in this example too, the Bail Reform Act of
1984 fails to fully achieve its purpose of adequately protecting the
public in a consistent, and thus most effective, manner.
Amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984 to include possession of
child pornography offenses alongside the other child sexual exploi-
tation offenses would result in consistent treatment of the same
harm and thus help fulfill one of the statute’s main purposes.
IV. RESPONDING TO OBJECTIONS
The best argument that critics have against amending the Bail
Reform Act of 1984 is that the mandatory-release provision itself is
unconstitutional. This argument has some support from the courts.
For example, to date at least six courts have found that this
portion of the Bail Reform Act violates the Constitution’s procedural
due process clause.318 At least one court has found that mandatory
conditions of release do not violate procedural due process.319
At least four courts have found that this portion of the Act
violates the excessive bail clause under the Eighth Amendment.320
At least two courts have found that the mandatory conditions do not
violate the Eighth Amendment.321
318. See United States v. Merritt, 612 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (D. Neb. 2009) (holding
Bail Reform Act of 1984 provisions allowing for the imposition of electronic monitoring and
curfew violate the Due Process Clause); United States v. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d 590,
607 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding the imposition of a curfew with electronic monitoring under
the Bail Reform Act of 1984 violates the Due Process Clause); United States v. Kennedy,
593 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (holding conditions of pretrial release man-
dated by Bail Reform Act of 1984 violate the Excessive Bail Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the separation of powers doctrine); United States v. Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d
591, 599, 601-02 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (holding the provision of the Bail Reform Act of 1984
mandating curfew with electronic monitoring for pretrial release facially denies procedural
due process and, as applied, violates the defendant’s Eight Amendment right “to be free
from excessive bail”); United States v. Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901, *3
(D. Kan. Nov. 20, 2007) (holding the imposition of electronic monitoring requirement as
a condition of release under the Bail Reform Act is unconstitutional because it denies
procedural due process and violates the Eighth Amendment and the separation of
powers doctrine); United States v. Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736, *11
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2006) (holding the conditions of release under the Bail Reform Act of
1984 deny procedural due process and violate the Eighth Amendment and the separation
of powers doctrine).
319. United States v. Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
320. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; Torres, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 601-02; Vujnovich,
No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901 at *3; Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736
at *11.
321. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1031.
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Finally, at least three courts have found that the mandatory re-
lease conditions violate the separation of powers doctrine.322 At least
two cases hold that they do not violate this doctrine.323
These numbers may be skewed because they account only for
published district court orders. Most district courts, however, do not
publish their orders, so it is possible that many judges have found
that the mandatory release conditions do not violate the Constitution,
but have not published these findings.
The constitutionality of this statutory provision is beyond the
scope of this article, but even if the mandatory release conditions
were ultimately found to be unconstitutional, the argument asserted
here that possession of child pornography offenses should be treated
in the exact same manner as other child sex offenses does not change.
Assuming the Supreme Court was to find the mandatory release pro-
vision unconstitutional, Congress should treat possession of child
pornography the same way that it treats the other federal sex crimes
against minors.
If, for example, Congress were to amend the statute to make the
release conditions a rebuttable presumption, possession of child por-
nography should be included in the rebuttable presumption category
alongside the other child sex crimes. In this way, the statute would
continue to fully achieve its purpose.
CONCLUSION
The Bail Reform Act of 1984 currently treats possession of child
pornography offenses differently from other federal sex crimes against
children in two ways: (1) it does not include possession of child por-
nography offenses in the mandatory-release-condition category of
cases; and (2) it does not include possession of child pornography
offenses in the rebuttable-presumption category of cases.324 This
omission inhibits the statute from fully achieving its incapacitation-
based purpose.
Simply put, the statute fails to fully achieve its underlying in-
capacitation-based purpose because, though Congress, the Supreme
Court, and the executive branch have recognized that possession of
child pornography results in grave and exceptional harms, the Act
does not treat possession of child pornography offenses proportionally
322. Kennedy, 593 F. Supp. 2d at 1224; Vujnovich, No. 07-20126-01, 2007 WL 4125901
at *3; Crowell, No. 06-CR-291E(F), 2006 WL 3541736 at *11.
323. Arzberger, 592 F. Supp. 2d at 607; Gardner, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
324. See supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of how possession
of child pornography is treated differently from similar offenses.
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to those resulting harms. The Act does not give proper weight to the
harms caused by the offense relative to pretrial treatment’s costs and
burdens, and also does not treat the offense consistently with other
offenses resulting in the same harms. If these harms are properly
weighted, it becomes clear that the Bail Reform Act of 1984 should
treat possession of child pornography the same way that it treats
the other federal sex offenses against minors.
The analysis applied here to the Bail Reform Act of 1984 is
useful because, as federal judges are presented with an increasing
number of defendants charged with possession of child pornography
offenses, and as many of these same judges fail to recognize the harms
resulting from this offense, amending the Bail Reform Act of 1984
would treat the offense with the seriousness that it deserves. The
analysis is also useful because, as legislatures around the country
promulgate more and more incapacitation-based statutes, the test, if
applied, helps ensure that new statutes are crafted to benefit society.
Protecting society is, after all, one of the main purposes of our criminal
justice system. This is especially true when it comes to protecting the
most vulnerable—our children.
